A risk can be imagined or it can be real; it can be immediate or distant. There are risks that an individual can control, and those over which he or she has no power. There are risks that have already resulted from past exposures and there are those that are predicted from exposures which have not taken place. Sensitivity to these distinctions is crucial not only for assessing and managing risks, but also for diagnosing and treating disease. [Rall, 1981 (1)1* Chemicals cause cancer. Some cause cancer in experimental animals. Certain chemicals cause cancer in humans. Fortunately, not all chemicals are considered either potentially carcinogenic to humans (2) (3) (4) or to animals (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) , and the proportion of chemicals eventually identified to cause cancer in experimental animals is forecast to be relatively low (10) . Occupationally associated cancers will continue to be discovered long into the future (11, 12) . Those chemicals identified as being causally associated with cancers in humans have all been shown to produce cancer in laboratory animals; in every instance at least one site ofcancer was common to both mammalian species (13) (14) (15) . This knowledge together with patent similarities in mechanisms ofcarcinogenesis across species (16) (17) (18) (19) led to the scientific logic that chemicals shown clearly to be carcinogenic in animals (13) (14) (15) 20, 21) should be considered as being likely to present cancer risks to humans (2, 4 Rall, I have taken the opportunity to reread many ofhis papers and have selected quotations from his works to emphasize the breadth and freshness of his vision, as well as to strengthen and complement the theme of my paper.
animais and humans than there are differences. These similarities increase the probability that results observed in a laboratory setting will predict similar results for humans. Clearly the accumulated experience inthe field of carcinogenesis supports this concept.
[RI et al., 1987 (21)] For those chemicals, mixtures ofchemicals, or undefined circumstances to which humans are exposed to known or potential health hazards such as carcinogens, the hallmark public health issue centers on what level ofexposure, ifany, will present no or little carcinogenic risks to the individuals or populations in unprotected or uniform conditions (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) . Obviously, if humans are not exposed to a chemical carcinogen, then the expectation that that chemical will be a carcinogenic hazard to humans must be recognized as not being readily possible. Yet, even this apparent comfort might be short-lived because other laboratory chemical curiosities or industrial intermediates have had or do exhibit widespread human exposure: examples are vinyl chloride (27) (28) (29) (30) , methyl isocyanate (31), tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (32, 33) , and 1,3-butadiene (34, 35) . Further, the concept of "safe" exposure levels to carcinogens accepts the erroneous concept of threshold (36) .
If thresholds do exist and the regulatory decisions are based on a nothreshold concept, there will be short-term economic losses. Ifthresholds do not exist and the regulatory decisions are based on thresholds, then there will be fewer short-termeconomic losses, but we would face a future of damaged somatic and germinal DNA and an increased incidence of neoplastic (and other) diseases.
[Rail, 1978 (37] In this paper, chemicals are identified that were first shown to cause cancer in laboratory animals and were only subsequently found to be associated with cancers in humans. For each, the epidemiological and experimental evidence are given to support this conclusion (2) (3) (4) 7, 8) .
But the issue is not thresholds or no thresholds; it is one ofadding a new carcinogen to a pool of present carcinogens. [Rall, 1978 (37)] Background and Data Sources
In 1979, Tomatis reported the first listing ofchemicals that initially were found to cause cancer in experimental carcinogenesis studies (13) and at some later time [and perhaps clinical or epidemiological investigations were stimulated by these data (38) ] evidence of carcinogenicity in humans came forth. The collection ofchemicals has been expanded since this early disclosure (3, 14, 21, 38) , and now includes upwards of 30 chemicals that are causally or probably associated with cancer in humans whereby the first implication of carcinogenesis was discovered in experimental animals ( Table 1) .
The primary collective sources ofthis information come from the IARC Monographs Series (3), the NCI/NTP Technical Report Series (7, 8) , the DHHS Reports on Carcinogens (4), the IARC Supplement7 (2), Tomatis et al. (14) , Huffand Rail (15), Huff et al. (39, 40) , Vainio et al. (41) , and the carcinogenesis literature. In a few instances wherefore the evidence from humans has not yet been evaluated by independent groups (e.g., DHHS or IARC), I have taken the opportunity to interpret the available findings on reported associations between exposure and human cancers (15, 26) ; and appropriate references are given to allow others to judge the levels ofevidence [(42) Table   2 ]. The agents listed in Table 1 are not complete, and others will surely be added in the future. For some, the possibility exists that (53) (54) (55) . Although they are immediately useful and life-saving, these cancer chemotherapeutic agents do cause toxicity at the high doses used and all too frequently eventually lead to cancer in other organs.
Once we have identified a hazard and estimated the risk, we must then determine whether it is socially acceptable, and ifso, at what level. But in considering this we are no longer in the realm ofthe scientist. This is a decision that should be made through our political process. At best, it should be based upon firm scientific data and clearly articulated social and economic values. [Rall, 1981 (1)] Undefined Exposure Circumstances For the 13 processes or occupations associated with cancer in humans, none have been evaluated properly in whole-animal laboratory experiments (3, 14, 15) . Other than using sentinel animals in the offending occupational setting or catching and examining native mammalian or avian stock, the design and conduct of "mimic experiments" on these processes are not logically feasible or logistically possible. One simply has to design more innovative experimental protocols to better evaluate likely correspondence in animals. Environmental sentinels have proven useful for identifying "carcinogenic environs," such as fish with liver tumors in Boston Harbor and elsewhere (56) .
The eight "life style" agents so far identified as causing carcinogenesis in humans have good complementation among species; however, neither alcoholic beverages nor smokeless tobacco has been studied adequately in laboratory animals. Experimental study of alcoholic beverages presents a unique and perhaps baffling dilemma of not only deciding how to design a "definitive" experiment (since the carcinogenic agent or agents have not been identified), but most importantly to which "cocktail" should the animals be exposed? One theory asserts that ethanol may simply be an "irritant promoter" acting locally (e.g., esophagus) as a cell stimulatory growth factor, thus being an "application-site" carcinogen. Some suggest that ethanol may be a co-carcinogen. Others believe that the causative carcinogen resides in the "nonalcoholic" portion of the spiritus frumenti. Perhaps experiments should be designed not using ethyl alcohol alone, but as a potential promoter or cocarcinogen (with what?) or better yet expose animals to the "alcoholic beverages" that humans actually drink. This can be done rather easily, but the mixture selected would somehow have to be a "universal drink." As an example, one could identify the top 10 brands consumed (liquors, beers, or wines, or even a combination of these three) and then concoct an exposure regimen mixture. This may or may not provide the final or definitive answers, but such an experiment would help to evaluate and validate once again the human-surrogate animal model. Until now limited data exist (57) to implicate ethyl alcohol alone as being carcinogenic to laboratory animals (5S). Nonetheless, alcohol beverages have been shown conclusively as being carcinogenic to humans for the oral cavity, pharynx, larynx, esophagus, and liver.
Out of the 63 agents considered to cause cancer in humans, 44 have or could be studied in long-term experiments using laboratory rodents; the 13 processes cannot. All 39 human carcino-gens that have undergone adequate experimental studies have been shown to cause cancer in animals, and exhibit concordance for tumor sites (14, 26, 45, 47) . For the five that may appear to show a lack of agreement, three are considered to have been studied inadequately (methyl-CCNU, MOPP, talc with asbestiform fibers) and two have yet to be evaluated in animals (alcoholic beverages and treosulfan).
Further, IARC has identified an additional 41 chemicals, groups of chemicals, or industrial processes that are probably carcinogenic to humans and sufficient evidence in animals, 8 have limited evidence in humans and no or inadequate data in animals (2, 3, 14) , 16 generally rest not on the actual experimental findings but a) on the interpretation of the data, b) on the system or model used to generate the data, c) on the person or organization conducting the investigations or reporting the findings, d) the forecast economic or employment aspects, and the eventual impact these findings will have on our personal and occupational environments. As long as these data are used to stimulate the regulatory process, the political, social, public, and scientific debates will continue (at times almost regardless of the actual facts). Nonetheless, this array of opinionated thought usually benefits all sides of a particular issue, and often results in scientifically based compromise and a more scientifically objective consensus. Ideally, one would hope that no personal interest in the benefits or economics of chemicals would come into play when considering the scientific evidence of carcinogenicity. Public, individual, and environmental health are too important.
The clear understanding and universal awareness that all chemicals known to induce cancer in humans, that have been studied under adequate experimental protocols also cause cancer in laboratory animals convince most prudent investigators and reasonably thinling scientists and regulators to the persuasive speculation that the obverse would similarly hold true: chemicals shown to unequivocally induce cancer in laboratory animals should be considered capable of and likely to cause cancer in humans. This public health position has served well and should continue. Nonetheless, the scientific debates will surely continue.
As more and more advancements are made in molecular carcinogenesis, our understanding ofthe mechanisms of cancer induction within the mammalian domain will allow us to shed more light on the value of using animals as predictive surrogates for humans (16-19, 67,77) . This will predictably further permit us to more closely approach the public health objective of preventing, substantially reducing, or virtually eliminating the burden of chemically induced and chemically enhanced cancers in humans (36, 78, 79) .
If an experiment yields a clear-cut negative result, there is little discussion about the meaning or the meaninglessness ofanimal studies. When a clear-cut and strong positive result occurs, there is also little discussion. When the result is a slightly positive experiment, interpretation becomes difficult and discussion becomes lengthy. Biology, unfortunately, does not come only in black or white, but in many shades of gray, and in these gray areas disagreement is particularly evident. [Rall, 1988 (52) has been causally associated with the development of lymphatic and hematopoietic cancers in humans (85, 86) . In a nested casecontrol study ofthe styrene-butadiene rubber industry [note: the rubber industry as a whole is considered a human carcinogen (2,3)j, Matanoski et al. (87) found that leukemia cases were associated with exposure to butadiene (odds ratio = 9.4; 95 % confidence interval = 2.1-23).
Certain other chemicals with strong animal data and in my view adequate human evidence seem to be prime candidates for further evaluation as human carcinogens (Table 3) .
As stated by Doll (11, 12) , the final number of proven occupational (and environmental) carcinogens may eventually be quite large. Thus we must continue in our scientific and public health efforts to identify potential carcinogenic hazards to humans, and for those agents that are considered to inflict undue harm these should no longer be permitted unregulated exposures.
Regarding causes of cancer in humans, Doll and Peto (136) argued that the causes of 97% of human cancers can be explainable, with a large proportion (10-70%; best estimate,35%) due to diet. Using the most relevant and common sites ofhuman cancer, Schmahl et al. (135) estimate only one-third of the cancers (in the Federal Republic of Germany) can be assigned ecologically to exogenous carcinogenic agents or lifestyle. These latter authors stress that indirect primary prevention, based on the probable summaration ofsubcarcinogenic effects of single carcinogens identified from animal experiments, may lead to a reduction of carcinogen-induced cancers even ifthe effects of a particular carcinogenic compound cannot be determined precisely. Regarding the influence ofdiet on the incidence and mortality of cancer, Schmahl et al. (135) agree with Byers and Graham (136) who indicate that the relationship between dietary factors and cancer increases has not revealed a single unequivocal conclusion of causality.
Most followers of the diet-causality theme appear to simply default this notion without unequivocal supporting evidence, often driven by the different cancers types occurring in different continental locations (137) (138) (139) (140) . If one examines the incidence or mortality maps of the United States for example, clustering or pockets ofcancers are perhaps the most striking observations. Do these distributions impugn diet as causal? Or must we investigate these "local outbreaks" rather than ascribing diet as the ultimate de facto carcinogen. As Boyland (141) (Table 2 ). Added to these simplified groupings one must consider other relevant data as well; that is, using a "weight-of-evidence" approach (21, 42) that, for example, takes into account the strength of the carcinogenic response in experimental animals (6) . In addition, all carcinogens are not equal in their carcinogenicity (e.g., Table 4 ) or in their potential to pose a cancer hazard to humans. Conversely, in my opinion, one cannot make a carcinogen out ofan innately noncarcinogen (or carcinogen into a noncarcinogen) simply by manipulating the experimental conditions or further, or by altering the protocol designs (e.g., using so-called high doses). Likewise, one should not attempt to label a carcinogen as a noncarcinogen because humans may be exposed to levels below or Table 5 ).
The decades-old question remains: how confident should we be that consensus experimental carcinogens will predict cancers in populations exposed to the same chemical or exposure circumstance? History, biology, and the theme of this paper certainly support the concept ofextrapolating carcinogenesis findings from animals to humans. Even more basic, will chemicals shown conclusively to cause cancers in laboratory animals also eventually be found to cause cancer in humans (Table 5) ? Ignoring for the moment the important and controversial issue of exposure, the answer is yes. The object correctness and prudency of this response come not only from the obvious cross-mammalian consistency but from knowing that nearly one-third ofthose agents considered carcinogenic to humans were discovered first in animals.
... a commitment to deal with this problem (of chemical-hazards) buys us into a highly imprecise world of inadequate data and conflicting values. Not only is the information incomplete, but if we do anticipate hazards and thereby prevent future disease, we will never know that we are right. In fact the naysayers will tell us that we cannot demonstrate that we were right, precisely because we are not willing to allow the evidence to accumulate. In short, the price we pay for being right is that we cannot prove that doing nothing was wrong. [Rall, 1981 (2) Here is to David Rall, a scientist and physician dedicated to the public health of the individual, of the nation, and of the world.
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